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Abstract—Machine Learning has been steadily gaining trac-
tion for its use in Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (A-NIDS). Research into this domain is frequently
performed using the KDD CUP 99 dataset as a benchmark.
Several studies question its usability while constructing a con-
temporary NIDS, due to the skewed response distribution, non-
stationarity, and failure to incorporate modern attacks. In this
paper, we compare the performance for KDD-99 alternatives
when trained using classification models commonly found in
literature: Neural Network, Support Vector Machine, Decision
Tree, Random Forest, Naive Bayes and K-Means. Applying the
SMOTE oversampling technique and random undersampling, we
create a balanced version of NSL-KDD and prove that skewed
target classes in KDD-99 and NSL-KDD hamper the efficacy of
classifiers on minority classes (U2R and R2L), leading to possible
security risks. We explore UNSW-NB15, a modern substitute
to KDD-99 with greater uniformity of pattern distribution. We
benchmark this dataset before and after SMOTE oversampling to
observe the effect on minority performance. Our results indicate
that classifiers trained on UNSW-NB15 match or better the
Weighted F1-Score of those trained on NSL-KDD and KDD-
99 in the binary case, thus advocating UNSW-NB15 as a modern
substitute to these datasets.
Keywords—KDD-99, NSL-KDD, Network Intrusion Detection,
Benchmarking, SMOTE, UNSW-NB15.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network security is an ever-evolving discipline where new
types of attacks manifest and must be mitigated on a daily
basis. This has led to the development of software to aid
the identification of security breaches from traffic packets in
real time: Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). These
can be further categorized into misuse-based (M-NIDS) and
anomaly-based systems (A-NIDS). M-NIDSs detect intrusions
by an exact matching of network traffic to known attack sig-
natures. An A-NIDS protects resources on computer networks
by differentiating ordinary and suspicious traffic patterns, even
those of which it has been previously unaware. Typically, A-
NIDS systems are either statistical-based, knowledge-based or
machine-learning based, with each category facing inherent
drawbacks. Statistical techniques are susceptible to being
gradually taught a deceptive version of normalcy, and rely on
the quasi-stationary process assumption [1]. Knowledge-based
expert systems employing predicates, state machine analysis
[2] and specifications [3] suffer from scalability problems: as
the number of attack vectors grows in tandem with the rise in
volume and variety of network traffic, it becomes exceedingly
difficult to construct an omniscient set of rules [4].
The state of art thus explores systems that automatically
gain knowledge of how to distinguish benign usage patterns
from malicious ones using a variety of machine learning tech-
niques. In a machine learning approach, a classifier (or model)
is trained using a machine learning algorithm on a dataset of
normal and abnormal traffic patterns. A trained model may
subsequently be employed to flag suspicious traffic in real
time. Such a dataset typically considers each pattern across
several features and an associated target class, which denotes
whether the pattern corresponds to normal or abnormal usage.
Further training on fresh examples allows the model to adapt
to the current network state. While systems adopting such
an approach are not without fault, the preeminent advantages
offered include the ability to gain knowledge without explicit
programming, and adaptability to dynamic traffic patterns [1].
The selection of a training dataset is integral to the security
of a modern A-NIDS using machine learning techniques. In
the ideal case, such datasets would be specific to each network
deployment [5]; however, a lack of alternatives has led to
several works focusing on the KDD CUP 99 dataset [6] as a
popular benchmark for classifier accuracy [7]. Unfortunately,
KDD-99 suffers several weaknesses which discourage its use
in the modern context, including: its age, highly skewed
targets, non-stationarity between training and test datasets,
pattern redundancy, and irrelevant features. Other researchers
have devised several countermeasures that mitigate these flaws.
An important effort by Tavallaee et al. [8] was to introduce
NSL-KDD, a more balanced resampling of KDD-99 where
focus is given to examples which are likely to be missed by
classifiers trained on the basic KDD-99.
A significant trend that has been discovered is the poor
performance of classifiers on minority classes of KDD-99, an978-1-5386-6227-4/18/$31.00 c© 2018 IEEE
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obstacle which NSL-KDD is unable to eliminate. We argue
that this is due to the extreme skewedness of the dataset
with respect to its target class distribution. In this work,
we empirically prove that NSL-SMOTE - a balanced dataset
constructed using oversampling and undersampling - shows
significant performance improvements over NSL-KDD on the
same minority classes.
The inherent age of the dataset is another major drawback.
At the time of this writing, KDD-99 is nearly two decades
old and proves insufficient and archaic in the modern security
context [5]. We believe that the inertia of extant research
using KDD-99 as the primary dataset makes authors reluctant
to “start from scratch” on another one when constructing
complex algorithms. Hence, a major contribution of this
work is to benchmark the performance of a modern and
balanced dataset, UNSW-NB15, on standard machine learning
classifiers used widely in academia. Consequently, we observe
the class-wise and Weighted F1-Score of Neural Network,
Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, Random Forest and
K-Means classifiers trained on UNSW-NB15. We then contrast
its performance to that of NB15-SMOTE, an oversampling
of UNSW-NB15’s minority classes. Finally, binarization of
targets eliminates imbalance and allows a direct comparison
of the datasets. Extant research conducted on KDD-99 is thus
aided by proving the suitability of basic machine learning
techniques on a more rounded dataset.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II briefly
describes the characteristics of KDD, NSL-KDD, and UNSW-
NB15. In Section III we present the Machine Learning
pipeline that we apply to train classification models on each
dataset. This also discusses SMOTE oversampling, which is
used to create the NSL-SMOTE and NB15-SMOTE datasets.
Section IV showcases and analyzes the results of different
classifiers obtained on these datasets. We conclude our paper
with our inferences in Section V.
II. DATASET DESCRIPTION
A. KDD CUP 99 Dataset
This is a modification of the dataset that originated from
an IDS program conducted at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory,
which was evaluated first in 1998 and again in 1999. The
program, funded by DARPA, yielded what is often referred to
as the DARPA98 dataset. Subsequently, this dataset was filtered
for use in the International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Competition [9], resulting in what we recognize
as the KDD CUP 99 dataset [6].
McHugh [10] noted several issues with DARPA98, in-
cluding the unrealistic network architecture, overt synthesis
of data, high tolerance for false alarms, and questionable
evaluation methodology. Tavallaee et al. [8], while proposing
an improved NSL-KDD, provided a comprehensive description
of the KDD CUP 99’s idiosyncrasies. The pertinent aspects are
noted below.
1) Genesis: This dataset constitutes the TCPdump data of
simulated network traffic captured in 1998 at Lincoln Labs.
Seven weeks of traffic resulted in five million connection
TABLE I
KDD CUP 1999 TRAIN AND TEST DATA DISTRIBUTION
Class Training Set Percentage Test Set Percentage
Normal 812,814 75.611% 60,593 19.481%
DoS 247,267 23.002% 229,853 73.901%
Probe 13,860 1.289% 4,166 1.339%
R2L 999 0.093% 16,189 5.205%
U2R 52 0.005% 228 0.073%
Total 1,074,992 100% 311,029 100%
records used for a training set. A further two weeks of network
traffic generated a test set with two million examples. The
complete schedule can be found at the MIT website [11].
KDD-99 is a filtered version of this data.
2) Target classes: KDD-99 has five classes of patterns:
Normal, DoS (Denial of Service), U2R (User to Root), R2L
(Remote to Local) and Probe (Probing Attack). Each intrusion
category is further subclassified by the specific procedure used
to execute that attack. We list the distribution of patterns into
target classes in Table I.
3) Size and redundancy: As provided, KDD’s training
dataset contains 4,898,431 data points. However, due to high
redundancy (78%), there exist only 1,074,992 unique data
points. Similarly, the test dataset is highly redundant (89.5%);
it was pruned from 2,984,154 to 311,029 patterns. We consider
these reduced datasets in this paper.
4) Features: Each pattern has 41 features, allocated to one
of three categories: Basic, Traffic, and Content. However, an
analysis of the Mean Decrease Impurity metric [12] found 17
to be irrelevant. We thus considered the ez 24 features during
our evaluation.
5) Skewedness: The skewed nature of the dataset is evident
from Table I: 98.61% of the data belongs to either the Normal
or DoS categories. As we see in later sections, this hampers
the performance of classifiers on the remaining classes.
6) Non-stationary: The non-stationary nature of the KDD-
99 dataset is clearly visible from train and test distributions in
Table I. The training set has 23% of its data as DoS examples
versus 73.9% in the test set; Normal is 75.61% of the train set
but only 19.48% of the test set. It has been demonstrated that
such divergence negatively affects performance [13]. Fugate
and Gattiker [14] investigate anomaly-detection techniques
on KDD-99, accounting for this problem by segmenting the
dataset and using a stationary partition for training.
B. NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD is an effort by Tavallaee et al. [8] to rectify
KDD-99 and overcome its drawbacks. However, as the authors
mention, the dataset is still subject to certain problems, such
as its non-representation of low footprint attacks [10].
The following aspects of NSL-KDD mark an improvement
over KDD-99.
TABLE II
NSL-KDD TRAIN AND TEST DATA DISTRIBUTION
Class Training Set Percentage Test Set Percentage
Normal 67,342 53.458% 9,710 43.075%
DoS 45,927 36.458% 7,457 33.080%
Probe 11,656 9.253% 2,421 10.740%
R2L 995 0.790% 2,754 12.217%
U2R 52 0.041% 200 0.887%
Total 125,972 100% 22,542 100%
TABLE III
UNSW-NB15 TRAIN AND TEST DATA DISTRIBUTION
Class Training Set Percentage Test Set Percentage
Analysis 2,000 1.141% 677 0.822%
Backdoor 1,746 0.996% 583 0.708%
DoS 12,264 6.994% 4,089 4.966%
Exploits 33,393 19.045% 11,132 13.521%
Fuzzers 18,184 10.371% 6,062 7.363%
Generic 40,000 22.813% 18,871 22.921%
Normal 56,000 31.938% 37,000 44.940%
Reconnaissance 10,491 5.983% 3,496 4.246%
Shell Code 1,133 0.646% 378 0.459%
Worms 130 0.074% 44 0.053%
Total 175,341 100% 82,332 100%
1) Size and redundancy: NSL-KDD has fewer data points
than KDD-99, all of which are unique. It is thus less com-
putationally expensive to use for training machine learning
models.
2) Features: As with KDD-99, certain parameters were
found unnecessary. A reduced set of 20 features found by
Mean Decrease Impurity was used in this paper.
3) Skewedness: NSL-KDD includes an undersampling of
the classes Normal, DoS and Probe. This mitigates some of the
problems associated with KDD-99’s skewedness; Section IV-A
compares the magnitude of improvement this makes to clas-
sifier performance.
4) Non-Stationarity: Table II shows the resampled distri-
bution of data that is NSL-KDD. The target spread of the
train and test sets are significantly more alike. NSL-KDD is a
stationary sampling of KDD CUP 99.
C. UNSW-NB15
The UNSW-NB15 dataset [15] is a modern KDD-99 al-
ternative . It is similar enough to KDD-99 in terms of its
method of generation and features to be a viable substitute,
but eliminates (or at least mitigates) several lacunas that make
KDD-99 inconvenient for use in a contemporary NIDS.
1) Genesis: This dataset was simulated using the IXIA
PerfectStorm tool at the ACCS (Australian Center of Cyber
Security) over two days, in sessions of 16 hours and 15 hours.
45 unique IP addresses were used over 3 networks, compared
to 11 IP addresses on 2 networks for KDD. Attacks were
chosen from a constantly-updated CVE site, while normal
behavior was not simulated. Packet-level traffic was captured
via TCPdump. A total of 2,540,044 records were generated
which can be found at the ADFA website [16]. A much smaller
partition was used for the UNSW-NB15 training and test data.
2) Target classes: NB15 was intended as a step up from
the archaic KDD dataset, and it incorporates 10 targets: one
Normal, and 9 anomalous, namely: Fuzzers, Analysis, Back-
doors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shell Code
and Worms.
The greater number of target classes (10 in NB15, vs. 5
in KDD) and a higher Null Error Rate (55.06% in NB15 vs.
26.1% in KDD) consequently has a mitigating effect on the
overall classifier accuracy. For this reason, in Section IV we
also consider the performance on binary UNSW-NB15, viz the
dataset with only Normal and an aggregated Attack classes. We
compare this to likewise binary versions of other datasets.
3) Size and redundancy: The train set contains 175,341
data points and test set 82,332. While these figures are a
fraction of KDD-99, we found the size sufficient to train
high-variance classifiers for intrusion detection. There are no
redundant data points.
4) Features: 49 Features were extracted using the Argus
and Bro-IDS tools and categorized into five groups: Flow,
Basic, Content, Time, and Additionally Generated. Once again,
the Mean Decrease Impurity metric filters out irrelevant fea-
tures. The reduced feature-set of size 30 is used.
5) Skewedness: We highlight the uniformity of UNSW-
NB15 compared to the traditional datasets by observing the
largest-to-smallest target ratio in Fig. 1. KDD-99 is the most
imbalanced. NSL-KDD attempts to alleviate this problem. At
a glance, UNSW-NB15’s skewedness is noticeably lower, a
fact which is corroborated by Moustafa and Slay’s statistical
analysis [17].
6) Non-Stationarity: Data stationarity is maintained be-
tween the training and test sets in NB15; as seen in Table III,
both have similar distributions.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section various machine learning techniques have
been utilized to measure classification performance on the
datasets and highlight their characteristics.
We follow the Machine Learning pipeline outlined in Fig. 2.
The Preprocessing, Feature Selection, Training and Prediction
stages are the most pertinent. As part of Preprocessing, we
construct the NSL-SMOTE and NB15-SMOTE datasets using
the SMOTE oversampling process and then random under-
sampling. The Training stage yields a Trained Model, which
is assessed on the feature-reduced Test Dataset. We apply
the pipeline to each of the datasets KDD-99, NSL-KDD,
NSL-SMOTE, UNSW-NB15 and NB15-SMOTE. Results are
explored in Section IV.
A. Preprocessing and Feature Selection
1) All three datasets have features with string values. We
map each unique string value to an integer.
Fig. 1. Largest-To-Smallest class ratio across datasets; KDD-99 is by far the
most skewed. UNSW-NB15 is measurably more uniform, especially for the
larger classes. SMOTE oversampling balances the datasets significantly.
2) KDD-99 faces high redundancy in both its training
and test set. The redundant examples were filtered for
computational convenience and to deter classifiers from
skewing towards the highly repeated classes.
3) To remove all irrelevant features we first rank these
features using the Gini Impurity Index [12].
We select predictors that have non-zero MDI. For the
KDD-99, only 24 of the 41 features were found to have
non-zero MDI. NSL-KDD was similarly reduced to 20,
and UNSW-NB15 dropped from 49 to 30.
4) We use mean standardization for feature scaling to
ensure all predictor values lie in a similar range. Mean
standardization centers each feature’s data vector around
the mean of the distribution and scales by the standard
deviation.
B. Oversampling and Undersampling
Yap B.W. et al. [18] suggests methods to achieve uni-
form distribution of pattern responses; we have elected to
use SMOTE and random undersampling. The Python library
imbalance-learn (version 0.2.1) [19] was used for this purpose.
SMOTE [20] is an oversampling technique used to boost
the counts of imbalanced targets. It is applied to NSL-KDD
and UNSW-NB15; the resulting training sets are referred to
as NSL-SMOTE and NB15-SMOTE respectively. The test sets
used for Prediction remain unchanged.
As SMOTE followed by undersampling on KDD-99 would
result in a dataset that is functionally identical to NSL-
SMOTE, we refrain from doing so.
1) SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique):
We alter the NSL-KDD training set to establish a ratio of
0.015 for U2R (minority) to Normal (majority), resulting
in slightly more than a thousand U2R examples. UNSW-
NB15’s Analysis and Backdoor are oversampled to
14,000 examples each (ratio of 0.25 to the Normal class),
and Shell Code and Worms to 2,800 each.
2) Random undersampling: To balance each class of NSL-
SMOTE to 995 examples, random undersampling was
used for the DoS, Normal, Probe are U2R targets. 995
was chosen as it is the number of data points in the R2L
class, which is now the minority class after oversampling
U2R. Random undersampling was not used during the
construction of NB15-SMOTE.
C. Training
As it is not our objective to explore complex learning
methodologies on the datasets discussed, we utilize a standard
package for the various classifiers discussed in this paper:
Python’s scikit-learn library (version 0.18.1) [21]. We have
found that classifiers trained using this package converge to
a local minima on a suitable timescale when dealing with
hundreds of thousands of data points.
Six machine learning models were implemented to establish
benchmarks. For each classifier, hyperparameters were tuned
using K-fold Cross Validation on each of the datasets with
K = 5. Randomized Grid Search was used to obtain the
respective hyperparameter values.
1) Naive Bayes: we use the default of Gaussian Naive
Bayes.
2) Support Vector Machine: a Radial Basis Function kernel
was used.
3) Decision Tree: both Entropy and Gini index were used
as splitting criterion; in each particular case, the one
yielding the highest cross-validation accuracy was used.
The depth was selected up to a maximum of 30.
4) Random Forest: criterion similar to Decision Tree were
used. The number of trees was cross-validated on up to
a maximum of 100.
5) Neural Network: architectures with between 1-3 hidden
layers were evaluated, with 20-100 neurons per layer.
6) K-Means using Majority Vote: we first apply K-Means
to group the dataset into 300-400 clusters.
During Prediction, each test pattern is assigned to the
cluster with the closest centroid in Euclidean distance.
The target is selected as the majority vote of the targets
in that cluster (with random assignment serving as a tie-
breaker).
D. Analysis Metrics
When analyzing the performance of classifiers on each
dataset, prevalent metrics we consider are Precision, Recall
and F1-Score. Values for each metric are calculated from the
confusion matrix of predictions.
1) F1-Score: It is calculated as the harmonic mean of pre-
cision and recall. Gives a single measure of comparison.
Higher is better.
F1-Score =
2PR
P + R
(1)
Where P is Precision and R is Recall
Fig. 2. Machine Learning Pipeline
2) Weighted F1-Score: the average of F1-Scores over all
classes of the dataset, each weighted by its Support.
Weighted F1-Score =
K∑
i=1
Supporti · F1i
Total
(2)
where F1i is the F1-Score predicted for the ith target
class.
3) Null Error Rate (NER): a measure of the misclassifi-
cation error inherent in the test dataset if our classifier
naively assigned every test pattern to the majority class.
NER = 1 − Supportm
Total
(3)
where Supportm is the number of examples in the
majority class.
We discount the pertinence of accuracy in the current
scenario. Classification accuracy is an insufficient metric when
assessing imbalanced datasets, as models can exhibit high
accuracy scores even while misclassifying all but a few ex-
amples in minority classes [22]. KDD’s skewedness and its
Null Error Rate (26.1%) versus that of a perfectly balanced
dataset with as many targets (80%), makes it susceptible to
this misconception.
However, despite common knowledge of this phenomenon,
a majority of works found during the literature study use
accuracy as their primary means of evaluation. In the Network
Intrusion Detection context, where even a meager number of
false negatives can be catastrophic, accuracy paints an overly
optimistic view of system security.
To circumvent the accuracy paradox, F1-score is used to
measure performance. This is a combined metric, the harmonic
mean of Precision and Recall. We present F1-Scores for each
model on a class-wise basis.
When we require a single variable to depict the overall clas-
sifier performance we use Weighted F1-Score. Our argument
is that a skewed summation of class-wise F1-Scores would
avoid the paradox more effectively than simple accuracy. In
the following section, we analyze dataset-wise as well as class-
wise performance using both these metrics.
Fig. 3. Mean F1-Scores of all models on minority classes R2L and U2R.
IV. RESULTS
A. KDD-99 vs. NSL-KDD
To demonstrate how imbalance hampers the performance
of classifiers on the smallest classes (U2R and R2L), we have
analyzed NSL-KDD before and after applying SMOTE and
random undersampling. Fig. 3 contrasts the results with KDD-
99. For the R2L class we observe a significant increase in the
F1-Score from KDD-99 to NSL-SMOTE (18 to 28, 6 to 24,
8 to 23, 8 to 31, 4 to 23). Significant gains are also achieved
from NSL-KDD to NSL-SMOTE (1 to 37 for Decision Tree,
7 to 32 for Neural Network, 0 to 25 for K-Means). A full
performance breakdown is detailed in Table IV.
It is interesting to note that there is a persistent decrease in
F1-Score for the DoS and Probe classes from KDD-99 to NSL-
SMOTE. This can be attributed to the inflated counts of DoS
patterns in KDD-99; with the undersampling, the classifiers
trained on NSL-SMOTE are forced to concentrate equally on
all classes, thus underfitting the DoS class compared to KDD.
NSL-KDD, which constitutes frequently misclassified records
in KDD and is more balanced, has F1-Scores similar to NSL-
SMOTE for the DoS class.
TABLE IV
A COMPARISON OF CLASS-WISE AND WEIGHTED F1-SCORES FOR
KDD-99, NSL-KDD, AND NSL-SMOTE.
Model Dataset F1-Score Weighted
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R
F1-Score
Naive Bayes
KDD-99 40 37 75 18 1 39
NSL-KDD 63 73 7 29 4 57
NSL-SMOTE 63 73 7 28 5 57
SVM
KDD-99 99 83 74 6 0 90
NSL-KDD 84 80 72 31 12 74
NSL-SMOTE 78 79 69 24 14 71
Decision Tree
KDD-99 98 84 71 8 4 90
NSL-KDD 84 77 66 3 12 68
NSL-SMOTE 79 79 71 23 12 71
Random Forest
KDD-99 97 80 83 6 2 89
NSL-KDD 87 79 70 0 4 70
NSL-SMOTE 85 81 61 14 28 72
Neural Network
KDD-99 98 84 83 8 2 91
NSL-KDD 85 79 74 3 5 71
NSL-SMOTE 75 80 68 31 18 70
K-Means
KDD-99 98 84 84 4 0 90
NSL-KDD 84 78 52 3 3 68
NSL-SMOTE 66 79 57 25 14 65
TABLE V
CLASS-WISE AND WEIGHTED F1-SCORES FOR UNSW-NB15
Class NaiveBayes SVM
Decision
Tree
Random
Forest
Neural
Network K-Means
Analysis 2 0 5 0 2 0
Backdoor 6 0 5 7 0 0
DoS 1 6 19 14 10 5
Exploits 42 64 64 70 64 60
Fuzzers 21 33 35 38 36 32
Generic 73 98 98 98 97 96
Normal 56 79 82 84 74 74
Reconnaissance 14 64 85 86 56 47
Shell Code 4 6 46 45 0 0
Worms 3 13 56 25 4 0
Weighted
F1-Score 50 72 76 77 70 68
B. UNSW-NB15
We argue that one of the major hurdles faced by researchers
in the domain of Network Intrusion Detection is the paucity
of results available for datasets other than KDD-99. UNSW-
NB15 was found to be a modern substitute which currently
lacks exposure, and hence we analyze the aforementioned
models with respect to this dataset. Additionally, we per-
form SMOTE oversampling to highlight the effect of class
imbalance even in UNSW-NB15. Unlike other works [17],
we consider primarily the Weighted F1-Score, as accuracy is
misleading for such data distributions.
From Table V, UNSW-NB15 is seen to exhibit high perfor-
mance on the Exploits, Generic, and Normal classes, which
TABLE VI
CLASS-WISE AND WEIGHTED F1-SCORES FOR NB15-SMOTE
Class NaiveBayes SVM
Decision
Tree
Random
Forest
Neural
Network K-Means
Analysis 1 2 6 13 4 4
Backdoor 6 16 4 7 2 6
DoS 1 15 22 21 11 2
Exploits 43 62 62 71 63 59
Fuzzers 21 31 32 39 33 31
Generic 73 94 98 98 97 95
Normal 55 81 83 84 81 74
Reconnaissance 4 62 84 87 53 49
Shell Code 4 14 34 41 25 16
Worms 3 0 35 65 21 5
Weighted
F1-Score 49 72 75 78 72 68
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF WEIGHTED F1-SCORES OVER ALL TEST SETS (BINARY)
Model KDD-99 NSL-KDD UNSW-NB15
Naive Bayes 86 78 76
SVM 94 82 82
Decision Tree 94 81 86.5
Random Forest 94 81 88.5
Neural Networks 94 81 84.88
K-Means 93 83 83
together consist over 73% of training data. The four responses
with the fewest patterns - Analysis, Backdoor, Shell Code and
Worms - make up just 2.857% of the data. Not surprisingly,
learning models do not perform well on these targets. The
exceptions seem to be Decision Tree and Random Forest
models. DoS performance remains weak as well, despite a
fair number of training patterns.
The application of SMOTE increases the support of Shell
Code and Worms to 2,800, and Analysis and Backdoor to
14,000. These classes together now constitute 16.48% of the
data. We see an improvement; the mean F1-Score of Shell
Code, for example, increases from 16.8 to 22.3. The total
mean increase for these four classes is 17.5 points. The largest
increase is Random Forest (from 25 to 65 in Worms).
As the datasets have different responses a direct comparison
is infeasible. Instead, we analyze classification on binarized
versions of KDD-99, NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15, seen in
Table VII. The Weighted F1-Score obtained for KDD-99 is
once again high, but as we saw earlier in Table IV, the indi-
vidual F1-Scores on minority classes in KDD-99 is anemic.
However, binarizing the data effectively hides this discrepancy.
As for the others, it is evident that UNSW-NB15 equals or
betters NSL-KDD on almost all learning models implemented.
V. DISCUSSION
The previous section details the results of the investigation.
It is seen that KDD’s highly oblique distribution of patterns
and non-stationarity between train and test sets, evident in
Table I, leads us to question the effectiveness of techniques
optimized on KDD-99. Observing Table IV, the minority F1-
Scores were found to be unsatisfactory: best scores for R2L
were 18 and 31 on KDD-99 and NSL-KDD respectively, and
4 and 12 for U2R. In contrast, the DoS F1-Score neared
98 on KDD-99 and 85 on NSL-KDD for most cases. Such
discrepancy in performance was obscured when considering
the accuracy and even Weighted F1-Scores. The problem is
exacerbated by binarization. We infer that machine learning
techniques optimized on KDD-99 and NSL-KDD may be
exposed to minority class attacks while claiming a higher
efficacy.
An imperative requirement is target uniformity. If a dataset
is balanced, the Null Error Rate grows in proportion to the
number of target classes, and multiclass classification is sub-
sequently more difficult. The converse occurs when targets are
imbalanced. Guo et al. explain this phenomenon and suggest
measures to counter it, including forgoing accuracy for other
metrics and oversampling smaller classes [25]. As a result, the
SMOTE technique [20] was used to oversample the U2R class
and construct NSL-SMOTE, a perfectly balanced dataset (refer
Section III). As seen in Fig. 3, this improved performance on
the minority classes: the mean F1-Score increased from NSL-
KDD to NSL-SMOTE by factors of 2.35 for U2R and 2.1
for R2L. We thus verify that dataset asymmetry plays a role
in the performance of KDD-99’s minority classes. However,
absolute scores remained marginal, suggesting that the lack
of natural diversity in the underlying data (52 for U2R)
led to oversampling of noisy and borderline examples [24].
Additional legitimate attack patterns might benefit detection.
In the latter half of our study we benchmarked
UNSW-NB15 - a contemporary network intrusion dataset.
UNSW-NB15 is less skewed than KDD-99 or NSL-KDD
(refer Fig. 1). However, with a largest-to-smallest class ratio
of 430, it still qualifies as imbalanced, and as a result minority
F1-Scores suffer (Table V). SMOTE oversampling improves
the situation, especially for Analysis and Backdoor (Table VI).
Observing the confusion matrix (not included) reveals that
Analysis, Backdoor and DoS are often misclassified as Ex-
ploits, regardless of the oversampling ratio selected; selective
oversampling may lead to better results.
The best performer was found to be Random Forest [26].
In this model, each tree is trained and becomes an expert on
a randomly-split subset of data; consequently, trees trained on
the oversampled minority classes are able to better classify
them. Increasing the support thus allows more such trees
to contribute to the majority vote. These results suggest
that bagging and boosting methods such as AdaBoost and
SMOTEBoost [27] may positively affect the performance of
minority targets. On the other hand, Gaussian Naive Bayes
was ineffectual in all scenarios explored. Ihe inflexibility of
the model on features with dependencies [28] seems to be the
contributing factor.
Binarizing the classes eliminates the problem of imbalance.
It was found that NB15 equals or betters the Weighted
F1-Score of NSL-KDD; as seen in Table VII, maximum
scores were 83 & 88.5, using NSL-KDD & UNSW-NB15
respectively. This leads us to reason that UNSW-NB15 would
train an adequate binary anomaly detector, often used as for
preliminary filtering in a multistage NIDS.
In summary the results strongly indicate that UNSW-NB15
can satisfactorily substitute the archaic KDD CUP 99 dataset
and even NSL-KDD when used to train machine learning
anomaly-based NIDSs. We thus encourage its use in forth-
coming research.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite common knowledge of its flaws [10], KDD CUP 99
and its parent DARPA98 have remained some of the most
widely used datasets in the annals of Anomaly-based Net-
work Intrusion Detection [23], [7], possibly due to a lack of
substitute datasets.
In this paper, we have evaluated UNSW-NB15, a dataset
with 10 modern attack classes and less skewed target dis-
tribution. F1 performance has been benchmarked on models
commonly trained on KDD-99 and NSL-KDD, to facilitate
UNSW-NB15’s adoption in future research. Moreover, we
have demonstrated how oversampling overcomes the anemic
performance of classifiers trained on NSL-KDD and UNSW-
NB15.
The results of this paper leave sufficient scope to optimize
performance by using alternative techniques across the ma-
chine learning pipeline in Fig. 2.
For example: (1) SMOTE or one of its popular variants
[29] could be used to balance the smaller classes in UNSW-
NB15. (2) Random undersampling as used in this paper leads
to several majority examples being ignored. To overcome this,
undersampling methods like EasyEnsemble and BalanceCas-
cade [30] may be used instead. (3) Ensemble methods other
than RandomForest have not been explored and have the
potential to vastly improve the F1 performance on minority
classes [31]. (4) Clustering techniques such as those proposed
by Wang et al. [32]. could be used for preprocessing or
outlier detection. Unsupervised learning may also be used for
classification, such as the hierarchical Self-Organizing Maps
(SOM) architectures [33]. The authors find that a 6-feature,
two-layer architecture (using both Kohonen and other SOMs)
optimized on KDD-99. (5) Hybrid approaches [23] taken to
analyze KDD-99 – especially involving high-variance models
such as SVMs and Neural Networks – may be applicable to
UNSW-NB15.
Finally, only a small portion of the ACCS labs data [16]
was used to configure UNSW-NB15; the total dataset of over
2.5 million records remains largely unexplored.
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